This paper. which briefly summarises recelll research by Treasury. tentatively quantifies intergenerational economic mobility in New Zealand using income data ji-orr1 a cohort study of people born in Dunedin in 1972 -1973, and occupation 
Introduction
lntergenerational mobilit) research has often estimated the relationship between the economic situation of parents and the economic situati on of their ch ildren as adults. This paper tentati vely tests the relationship in New Zea land between parents' economic situation and the subsequent economic situation of their grownup children using t\-vo different model specifications and datasets.
Treasw·y is interested in understanding how intergenerational mobility affects equality of opportunit), skills deYelopment. economic efficiency, producti\'it)·. and li ving standards. realising that high rates of intergenerational mobility are not strictly necessary for achieving progress across all those domains. Low intergenerationaJ mobility can imply that, because of their backgrounds. people are unable to fully de' elop and use their ski lls and abilities. As well as signalling low equalit)· of opportunit)', this would constitute an inefficient use of a country's human capital (OECD. 2008. p. 3) . Conversely, some policies that facilitate skill development and productivity could feasibly lower observed rates of intergenerational mobility and vice \'ersa. For example, expanding tertiary education provision in Britain dw·ing the 1960s and 1970s boosted aggregate ski lis and education levels, but the greatest grO\\th in participation rates was initially among those from bener-off families (Jo Blanden. Gregg. & Machin. 2005 , p. 12: Jo Blanden & Mach in. 2007 .
We therefore need to be cautious in interpreting what measmes of intergenerational mobility may mean for economtc progress.
A country's economy undoubtedly benefits when all parents invest time, emotional commitment, and money in their children. Many parents are also supportive if their children aspire to have a similar career to themselves, or if their children want to work in a family business (d 'Addio. 2007 . p. 11: Roemer, 2004 . Nevertheless, policies that aim to improve the aspirations, preferences. and skills of those from disadvantaged home environments can sometimes enhance intergenerational mobility and arguably economic growth (d 'Addio, 2007, p. 11 ).
Studying intergenerational economic mobility in New Zealand can shed light on the opportunity New Zealanders have to advance themselves, relative to the economic position of their parents, compared to people in other developed countries. The level of intergenerational mobility is an important measure of the economic openness of a soc iety and of the level of opportunity, although generational mobility is by no means the only measw·e of these goals (Corak, 2006, p. 12; d'Addio, 2007, p. 12) . Policies to increase intergenerational mobi lity may sometimes also affect the achievement of other policy objectives, such as individual freedom, making specifying an ideal level difficult (Roemer, 2004, p. 51 While there have been a growing number of overseas studies of intergenerational mobility (Cm·ak, 2006) , the literature on this topic for New Zealand is very limited. This paper first outlines the methods used by economists to study intergenerational mobility. Income and occupational intergenerational mobility rates in New Zealand are then quantified using two different datasets. These results enable us to cautiously compare rates of intergenerational mobility in New Zealand to those in other developed countries.
1
Calculating intergenerational mobility
Economists have usually studied intergenerational mobility by examining the extent to which a person's childhood economic circumstances predict their adult economic circumstances. The following model estimates intergenerational income mobility:
where:
ln(~.c) = a natural log of an indiYidual's permanent income when they have grown up (or a proxy). i = the family to which children and parents belong t = an index of generations cc= the constant p = the intergenerational income elasticity (the marginal effect of a 1% change in parent a I income)
ln (l'f.c-1 ) =a natural log of parents· income (usually just of fathers) when their children were growing up Zu = other variables that may feasibly affect incomes. E = a random error term.
The intergenerational income elasticity (fJ \'alue) quantifies intergenerational mobility by estimating the effect of a change in the income of a person· s parents on their own income as an adult. Assuming that everything else is constant, higher estimates of the intergenerational income elasticity imply larger parental income effects on the incomes of their children and lower intergenerational mobility. A positive intergenerational income elasticity implies that children from higher income families on average grow up to eam more than children from lower income families (holding any factors constant according to model specification).
Demanding data requirements make accurately calculating intergenerational income mobilit) difficult. Unfortunately relatively few studies ha\ e collected data on people's economic circumstances for prolonged periods (Corak, 2006, p. 6) . Accurately measuring people's economic situation is also often difficult as their income may vary from year to year. A person's type of work also affects how their income changes as they become older, with some groups of workers reaching their peak earning years earlier than other workers. Higher and more accurate intergenerational mobility results usually occur when a large nwnber of income measurements fi:om peak-earning years are available. As a result, estimates of intergenerational mobility are ''highly sensitive" to the number of income measurements available, and the age at which earnings are observed (Haider & Solon, 2006 , p. 1309 Jantti, et al., 2006, pp. 3, 20) . The rate of intergenerational income mobility in some countries is therefore uncertain and widely debated, and there are still no estimates available for many developed countries (OECD. 2008, p. 4 ) . (Electoral Law Committee, 1998, pp. 26-33; Vowles, 2002, pp. 99-193) . The Election Study weight ensw·es that the data matches voting behaviour. but the data does not always pe1fectly mirror the characteristics of New Zealand's population. As a result, caution is necessary when interpreting the results.
The New Zealand data
People· s occupation determined their SES score. The average income of people in different occupations in the 1996 census. together with data on their educational qualifications and survey data on the value of goods they consumed, was used to calculate the SES of occupations (Davis, Jenkin. & Coope, 2003, pp. 12-16) . Since occupation is an excellent indicator of permanent income (the average income than an individual expects to recei\'e over their lifetime). data on SES has frequently been used to calculate intergenerational mobility (Jo Blanden. 2008. 16) . While people's SES is not the same as their income. the SES scores correlate with health and economic outcomes (Davis, et al.. 2003, p. 11 ).
4
The Dunedin Study results
The results in this section relate to individuals who were born in Dtmedin between April 1972 and March 1973. Table I shows intergenerational income elasticity estimates and confidence inter\'als for fi\'e models of intergenerational mobility. 5 The first model tested how well the incomes of fathers explained the incomes of male participants. with the standard controls of father's age and father's age squared (Solon. 1992. p. 399 Table   I ), indicating that a wide range of other factors influence . . " .
parnc1pants mcomes.
The estimated intergenerational income elasticity for women was .22 (see model two), but the probability of .14 associated with the F score indicates that the explanatory variables did not reliably predict the adult income of female Dunedin Study members. 7 Model two also explained just 1.5% of the variance in women's incomes. r-.teasw·ing intergenerational mobility for women in the Dunedin Study is difficult because the labour force participation of some women was limited by the time they were spending looking after children. At age 3 2, 13.4% of women and 1.1% of men in the Dunedin Study were out of the workforce because they were homemakers or beneficiaries. The overlapping confidence inten·als show that the difference between the intergenerational income elasticities for men and women is not statistically significant.
For the third model we included all participants and dropped the statistically insignificant variables for the age of fathers. For all participants we got an intergenerational income elasticity of .26, with the confidence intervals stretching between .14 and .39. Although the proportion of variance explained is higher than for the first two models, this has occurred because we have pooled men and women. Although the single-gender models allowed for a gender difference in the effect of father's income, they isolated the "within gender" variation in incomes and therefore did not attempt to explain the "between gender" variation. Model 3 does this by including a control for the tendency for men to earn more than women. Tests of whether the effect of father's income differed for men and women indicated no significant difference. so no interaction term is included in the model. The pooled model without the gender control explains only 1.4% of the variance in incomes, which implies that the gender control explains more of the variance in incomes than fathers' income alone.
Most overseas studies of intergenerational income mobility have used the income of participants' fathers as the main explanatory variable. This is because the incomes of women tend to fluctuate more. However, studying the combined effect of both parents' incomes arguably produces a richer picture of intergenerational mobility (Corak, 2006, pp. 9, 11 Some of the effects of parents' incomes on the incomes of their children occur because children from bener-off families tend to spend longer in the education system. In model fi ve we followed overseas studies by adding variables for participants' educational qualifications (Jo Blanden, Goodman, Gregg, & Machin, 2004 . p. 139: Ng, 2007 . This resulted in a lower intergenerational income elasticity point estimate, with the results indicating that on average about 4 7% of the effects of family background on income were mediated tlu·ough educational qualifications, and about 53% occurred through other channels. Calculating this effect using a series of regression equations (not shown here) produced a similar result.
We have to be cautious when trying to quantify the effects of education because qualifications and years of education are an imperfect proxy for the quality of a person's education. Using these imperfect proxies may cause the effects of educational achievement to be underestimated. However, adding additional control variables, such as physical and mental health, would probably diminish the apparent effects of education (Bowles & Gintis, 2002, p. 5) .
We also cannot tell if having high income parents in itself results in people spending longer in the education system. Further research might show that other variables, such as parental education levels and a supp011ive home environment, are more impot1ant (Piraino. 2007. p. 17 occupational mobility. The average income of people in different occupations in the 1996 census, together with data on their educational qualifications and the value of goods they consumed, was used to calculate the SES of occupations (Davis, et al., 2003, pp. 12-16) . Because of the distribution of the SES data, we were able to use it unlogged in our regression equations. TheSES scores run from 10 (textile workers) to 90 (senior managers).
Because of the different model specifications and units of measurement, the results are not directly comparable with those from the Dunedin Study.
Many people experiment with different jobs when entering the workforce, while young New Zealanders often travel after they finish their education. We therefore followed an overseas study by only including those who were 25 years or older (Ennisch. Francesconi, & Siedler.
2006). Table 2 shows that the estimate for the average effect of the SES of fathers on the SES of their children was .20 (model one). This implies that, everything else being equal, a person whose father had an SES 10 points higher than average would themselves have an SES two points higher than average as an adult. The average effect of father's SES for men was .23 (model two) and for women was similar at .18 (model three). Because of the large size of the dataset. the confidence intervals are smaller than for the DWledin data. For instance, the confidence interval in model one for all respondents nms from .16 to .24.
The estimated intergenerational effect of father's SES once controls for respondents' educational qualifications were added (model four) fell to just .11, which is 55% of the size of this effect before education was added.
However, calculating this effect using a series of regression equations (not shown), which is a theoretically more precise way of calculating these effects, suggested that only about 35% of the intergenerational effect of father's SES occurs because children who had high SES father's tended to continue their education for longer than other children. The explanatory power of the models (a! measured by the adjusted proportion of variance explained) increased to a more substantial 19% in model four, compared to a low 3.8% to 5.0% in the earlier models. We have to be extremely cautious when interpreting the results because the questions used to impute years of education resulted in considerable imprecision, while years of education are an imperfect proxy for the quality of a person's education. Using the 1993 Ne\\ Zealand Election Study dataset generated similar intergenerational mobility point estimates. 111 ay reflect methodological differences between studies rather than real differences in intergenerational mobility (Gorard, 2008, pp . 320 1 322). Zealand. This may result in estimates for these countries being higher than if incomes were measured at the same age and the same number of times as in New Zealand. When people are in their late thitties, theit· income is more likely to be an accurate indicator of their life-time eamings. Having additional years of income data results in a more accurate picture of peoples economic circumstances over time (Jantti, et al., 2006, p. 20; Solon, 2002, pp. 61-63) . However, OLu· data may include people from a wider range of income groups than overseas studies. Most of the studies in Table 3 exclude people whose father was not working, and this may reduce the magnitude of estimates in these countries (Fortin & Lefebvre, 1998, p. 17; Gorard, 2008, p. 320; Jantti, et al., 2006, pp. 28-30) . These and other differences in the data and in sample selection rules reduce the comparability of the Table 3 estimates (Solon, 2002, pp. 61-63 ) . 
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All results in this table were generated using Ordinary Least Squares regression. This table excludes studies using predicted income for parents (Australia, F ranee, Italy, and Spain) because this method tends to yield di llerent results to using actua t income.
The confidence intervals for New Zealand are much wider than for most other countries, with this reflecting our relatively small sample size and a weak relationship (compared to other variables) between parental income and a person's ov.n income. In many of the countries included in Table 3 , the entire bit·th cohort for one or more years is included, provided they had positive earnings as an adult and were still living in their home country. However, ow· sample size and confidence intervals are similar in size to Solon 's for men in the United States, and are similar to those for an early study in Britain (Atkinson, 1980; Solon, 1992, p. 401 The results show that our 95% confidence intervals for intergenerational income mobility in New Zealand overlap with those of most other developed countries. At a 5% level. only men in Denmark are more mobile than men from New Zealand. Comparing the results for different counu·ies using 90% confidence intervals (not shown here) did not result in any additional differences between rates of intergenerational mobility for New Zealand men and men in other countries emerging. Even using 90% confidence intervals there were no statistically significant differences between rates of intergenerational income mobility for New Zealand women and women in other countries. Ow· results suggest that rates of intergenerational income mobility for New Zealand men and women are probably within a similar range to rates of intergenerational income mobility m most other de\ eloped counu·ies.
Other researchers comparing rates of intergenerational income mobility between counu·ies ha\'e often initial!) repo11ed similarly inconclusiYe findings (Bjorklund & Janntti. 1997 , pp. 1016 -1017 : Solon. 1999 . p. 1787 .
Greater certainty about the relative position of countries has usually resulted from applying the same methods and methodological assumptions to datasets from different countries. and by increasing the number of cases (Grawe. 2004 . pp. 65-66. 70: Jantti. et al.. 2006 . Figure 1 compares intergenerational occupational mobilit) in Ne'' Zealand using Election Study data to the results for Britain and German) in a similar overseas study (Ennisch. et al.. 2006. pp. 666-669) . Ow· results suggest that men and women in New Zealand had slightly higher intergenerational occupational mobility than people 25 years or older in Britain and that this difference was barely significant at a I 0% le\el. Men in New Zealand also had higher occupational mobility than men 25 vears or older in Ge1manv. and this difference was .
. statistical!) significant at a 5° o Je,el. Although ow· point estimate for Ne\\ Zealand women is lower than the point estimate for German women, even 90% confidence inter\'als O\'erlapped. In Britain and Germany, however, the standard deviations for respondents' ages suggest respondents were born within a narrower time period that in New Zealand (Erm isch, et al., 2006, p. 668) . Possibly there are other methodological differences between the two studies that we are unaware of, but that affect the results. We should therefore be extremely cautious when comparing the results for New Zealand with those for Britain and Germany.
Our point estimate for New Zealand men is very similar to an unpublished intergenerational occupational mobility point estimate for New Zealand men in an overseas stud}'.
Although the results of that study suggested that New Zealand had high intergenerational occupational mobility compared to other countries, with New Zealand placed third out of 32 countries, unfortunately confidence intervals were not included (Jo Blanden, 2008, p. 34) .
Conclusion
This paper has been the first in-depth research since the 1980s into intergenerational economic mobility in New Zealand. Our research has been exploratory and our findings are vel) tentative.
Using data from the Dunedin Study, our model estimated an intergenerational income elasticity of .26 with 95% confidence interYals of .14 and .39. This implies that a 1% increase in father·s income is associated with a 0.26% increase in the income of an individual at age 32, with this estimate consistent with being between 0.14% and 0.39% with 95% confidence. Using combined parents' income. rather than father's income, as the main explanatory variable had very little effect on the results. The childhood income of a person's parents seems to explain only a small proportion of the variance in their adult income. We were unable to reach firm conclusions about the rate of intergenerational income mobility in New Zealand compared to most other developed countries. '"'ith the confidence intervals for our point estimates overlapping with the confidence intervals for almost all other developed countries.
We also used occupation data from the nation-wide 1996 Election Study to see what effect the SES of a person's father had on their own SES when they were grown up. When the Election Study analysis was restricted to people aged 25 or over the effect of father's SES on the SES of their children was .20 in 1996, with 95% confidence inten·als of .16 and .24, although only a small proportion of the ,·ariance in people's SES was explained. There was weak evidence that intergenerational occupational mobility for New Zealanders was higher than for people in Britain. and stronger evidence that New Zealand men were more intergenerationally occupationally mobile than German men. In sufficient data is available to reach cone I us ions about intergenerational occupational mobility in Ne'' Zealand compared to other countries.
Our results suggest that in New Zealand some of the effect of parents' income or father's SES on the economic outcomes of their children occurs because children from better-off families tend to spend longer in the education system. Our estimate for this proportion using Dunedin Study data was just under half, while ow· best estimate using the Election Study data was about a third. These are very approximate proportions, and adding additional variables to our models would reduce these effects (Bowles & Gintis, 2002, p. 22) .
It should be emphasised that our findings are very preliminary. When Dunedin Study participants are in their late thirties they are more likely to be in their peak earning years. Using data from the planned [2010] [2011] assessments should result in more accurate, but still imperfect, estimates of intergenerational income mobility (Haider & Solon, 2006, p. 13 I 7) . Future researchers could increase the number of cases that can be included in the Dunedin Study models by imputing missing income data for pru1icipants' parents from information on their occupation, education, age, and employment status. In addition. calculating an income for each pru·ent in the top income group from other data might produce a more sophisticated picture of the economic circumstances of some families. Possibly other datasets containing the incomes of New Zealand children and of their parents could be developed. In 2008 the New Zealand Election Study asked about the occupations of respondents' parents for the first time since 1996, and this data could be used to update our research into intergenerational occupational mobility.
Notes l.
Treasury plans to publish fuller details of ow· intergenerational mobility findings at a later date.
2.
The Pearson' s con·elation shows the strength of linear dependence between two variables and gives a value between -1 and 1.
3.
4.
5.
6.
http ://www. nzes.org/exec/s how/ 1996
The correlation between Election Study income results and SES is only .32, although the eight income bands the Election Study used are not ideally designed for the comparison. In contrast. for the Dunedin Study participants the relationship between SES and income is .45
Restricting the analysis to just those living in New Zealand (results not shown here) produced broadly similar point estimates.
In this example the only requirement is that these men have the same aged father. The model does not control for the effects of other characteristics. The elasticity is for the effect of the log of fathers' incomes on the log of sons' incomes. To calculate an estimated income it is necessary to multiply the log of father's income by the elasticity, multiply the father's age and age squared by the coefficients for these variables, add the intercept, then take an anti-log.
7.
However, when we drop the age variables the model just crosses the threshold for being statistically significant.
8.
In addition, we only have data on five stages of educational achievement, rather than the exact number of years participants spent in the education system. However, rerunning the models using a variable for self-reponed months of education between 15 and 21 had only a slight effect on the results.
